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Quality and affordability are not the only important factors to consider when developing 
subsidized housing policy.  Historically, subsidized housing has clustered in low income neighborhoods, 
furthering segregation and isolation of low income residents in cities across the country.  Spillovers 
from housing programs have affected surrounding neighborhoods to long-lasting effect.  Decisions 
regarding locations of subsidized housing involve consideration of efforts to create stable, integrated 
neighborhoods.  Developing new, high quality affordable units may act as economic development in low 
income neighborhoods, bringing opportunity both to subsidized tenants and nearby residents.  It may 
spur further investment in the area, attracting additional new development and resources, into 
previously deteriorated contexts.  However, with historical controversy over large scale renewal efforts, 
there are fears that this change could go too far, leading to gentrification that pushes out low income 
residents not in subsidized units.  This history, and attempts to correct it, are reflected in Atlanta in the 
progression from public housing to widespread HOPE VI redevelopment to small-scale but continual 
LIHTC development. 
Additionally, neighborhood context can have a large effect on access to opportunity for tenants.  
Concentrating affordable housing in low income neighborhoods also furthers the concentration of 
poverty, and exacerbates associated issues.  Thus more recent efforts have attempted to introduce 
units for low income tenants into higher income neighborhoods.  Existing residents, however, often 
react with fear that bringing in low income renters will lower property values and change the character 
of the neighborhood for the worse.  Fear of not only economic effects, but spillovers of potential crime 
and perceived moral ills are what resulted in the segregation and clustering of subsidized housing 
developments from the start.  Today, existing high land acquisition values, exclusionary zoning, and 
overall local resistance all act as barriers to attempts at regional integration through subsidized housing 
development.   
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Whether these fears are founded in reality can help decide how these barriers can be 
overcome.  Numerous studies discuss effects of historical subsidized housing endeavors in Atlanta, as 
well as effects of the current Low Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) program in other cities.  Studying 
the effects of recent LIHTC developments in Atlanta neighborhoods may uncover the veracity of either 
NIMBYism fears or gentrification worries, and thus inform future policy efforts towards regional income 
integration. 
This study looks at how the number of LIHTC units in a census tract affects neighborhood 
characteristics after they are placed in service.  A series of statistical regressions on these 
characteristics show that LIHTC units do not decrease property values and do not increase rents.  This 
bodes well both to counter fears of NIMBYism and gentrification. 
Historical Context 
Public Housing and HOPE VI in Atlanta 
During the Great Depression, the initial public housing projects were meant to be a long-term 
method of housing the poor.  The construction activity was meant to create jobs and stimulate the 
economy, while the developments themselves were intended to be places where “families of modest 
means lived briefly while they worked hard to win a share of the American Dream” (AHA 2010: 6).  
However, decades later, changing policies and circumstances resulted in severely distressed properties 
that essentially trapped people in poverty.   
Nowhere was this more apparent than in Atlanta, GA.  In 1936, Atlanta was a “pioneer city” for 
public housing, with Techwood Homes located downtown as the first project (AHA 2010: 4).  However, 
initial lofty goals fell by the wayside and by the 1990s, Atlanta was the most violent city in the US, with 
crime concentrated in public housing projects at thirty-five times the rate of the city (AHA 2010: 9).  
Rampant among public housing residents were myriad health problems, unemployment (less than 20% 
were employed), and the worst schools in the state (AHA 2010: 9).  In the decades preceding HOPE VI, 
AHA invested $18 million renovating Techwood/Clark Howell Homes alone, but by 1994 “none of these 
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improvements were visible” (Boston 2005: 14).  Overall the shoddy initial construction of the structures 
made upkeep financially infeasible.  88% of inspected units did not meet sanitary standards and 
vacancy rates were excessive, ranging from 20-50% (Boston 2005: 13-14).  “What had begun as a bold 
social experiment to open the door into the middle class became a wall that forever separated public 
housing residents from economic opportunity” (AHA 2010: 6). 
In 1995, HUD evaluated the Atlanta Housing Authority (AHA) management of its public housing, 
and awarded it a measly 37% out of possible points (Boston 2010: 15).  Thus, when Atlanta was named 
as host of the 1996 Summer Olympics, for the city to represent its best face to the country and to the 
world, addressing the blight of public housing was essential-- the international eye certainly would not 
ignore it (AHA 2010: 5).  Instead of possible receivership by the federal government, this led to the 
assembly of a new team-- including Renee Glover and other professionals from outside the failing 
public department-- and a new approach to public housing: one that would help lift both people and 
neighborhoods out of isolated blight and poverty.  The new department positioned this approach as a 
win-win solution for both low-income residents and economic development of the city.   Others cite 
Renee Glover’s history as a corporate lawyer and senior aide for the new pro-business mayor Earl 
Phillips as evidence of where “true allegiances” lie (Keating and Flores 2000: 297). 
In 1989, the Congress’s National Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing found that 
86,000 out of 1.3 million public housing units nationwide qualified as “severely distressed” (Popkin, et 
al, 2004: 1).  Clearly the current approach to public housing was inadequate, so they developed 
Housing for People Everywhere (HOPE VI) grants for states to try a new way of providing public 
housing.   
A fundamental premise of this program was that physical response to social issues is not 
enough.  Providing shelter may be better than no shelter, but by isolating low-income families socially 
and economically public housing actually served to worsen conditions.  “After a few years of living in 
this social disorder, families that were only seeking rental assistance tended to become poorer and  
poorer,  more  dependent,  distrustful and further stigmatized” (AHA 2010: 23).  Any type of housing 
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may be better than no housing, but the context in which this shelter exists shapes the socioeconomic 
trajectory of its residents.  Attempts to separate poor people from greater society did not allow more 
affluent areas to flourish;  the blight of these “warehouses for people” only compounded the problem, as 
concentration exacerbated conditions for surrounding areas (AHA 2010: 6).  As Boston concludes, 
“environment matters”; poverty is not a natural state specific to some people nor a punishment for loose 
morals (2010).  Rather “people are poor” simply “because they have fewer resources than they need to 
live a more affluent life” (Glover, AHA 2010: 10).  Unlike commonplace fears that poor people may not 
be capable of living in “mainstream” society and would destroy the communities of more affluent 
neighborhoods with their intrinsic social ills, if put in a new context with fresh opportunity and higher 
expectations, poor people have the capability to flourish. 
 HOPE VI also had economic development goals, and the AHA used it as a vehicle to promote 
“innovative” public-private partnerships that would reclaim valuable central city locations before the 
Olympics (AHA 2010: 29).  In addition to leveraging private financing for community amenities, and not 
just housing development, HOPE VI also changed the demographics of the neighborhoods, by 
replacing 100% public housing units with only 40% public housing units, 23% rent subsidized, and 36% 
market rate (Popkin, et al, 2004: 15).  This resulted in a controversial large-scale displacement of 
original residents across the region; in all only 17% were able to return to new communities (Keating 
and Flores 2000: 302). 
Thus, in regards to economic development goals, Keating saw HOPE VI as a continuation of 
urban renewal programs that catered to opportunity goals of “business-led political coalitions” at the 
expense of displacing poor minority populations without adequate planning engagement, support, or 
compensation (2000).  In this perspective, HOPE VI was an excuse to clear poor people off of valuable 
land and hide them before the Olympics came to town, rather than an attempt to improve lives and 
address issues of poverty.  The public-private partnerships also position the government to prioritize 
capital investment over people and ties in with the neoliberal shift in the “role of urban governance from 
managerialism to entrepreneurialism” (Hanlon 2007: 83).  Instead of constructing, managing, and 
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maintaining public housing as a form of direct governance, public housing authorities (PHA) instead 
incentivize private developers to create market-quality housing with an affordability component.   
 
Low Income Housing Tax Credits 
The most popular way that public-private partnerships to foster affordable housing development 
occurs is through LIHTC, in which private and nonprofit developers leverage private equity investment 
in exchange for tax credits, although the neighborhood effect of these developments have not been 
studied to the extent HOPE VI has.  Each state determines priorities and standards for developments 
based on a Qualified Allocation Plan (QAP), which determines which projects get tax credits and 
awards competitive points based on a multitude of objectives.  While the specificities of the QAP 
change in Georgia each year, its general objective is to produce a quality product that does not 
recreate the ills of concentrated poverty associated with traditional public housing.  LIHTC 
developments ideally fill the affordable housing market gap with safe, quality units as well as encourage 
positive impact on the surrounding neighborhood. 
However, there is a tension in regards to where the QAP encourages developers to locate 
projects.  On the one hand, under federal law, it grants bonuses of a 30% boost for developments in 
Qualified Census Tracts (QCT) and Difficult to Develop Areas (DDA).  This encourages developers to 
provide housing in high poverty communities with a greater need for affordable housing where they 
might not otherwise build high-quality construction.  A study of tracts with LIHTC in Chicago shows that 
these QCTs attract about six more units over the 18 year study period than non-QCTs (Baum-Snow 
and Marion 2009, 654).  This shows that the basis boost either attracts more developers to submit 
applications in these tracts or that states are more willing to fund these projects.   
To avoid concentrating poverty and recreating the isolation and disinvestment problems of past 
public housing projects, the QAP also awards points to QCT-located projects with Community 
Revitalization plans that show that the local government is also invested in bringing development to the 
area.  On the other hand, the Georgia QAP, like many state plans, also encourages development in 
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communities with good resources available to residents, through awarding competitive bonus points 
(DCA 2009-2014).  For example, competitive scoring might favor places in high performing school 
districts, near desirable amenities like grocery stores, and near employment opportunities.  This works 
to aid in deconcentrating poverty and allowing low income residents to have access to resources more 
often available in higher income communities.  Thus, there is a tension between locating projects with 
the goal to improve neighborhoods as a community development project and with the goal to improve 
the living situation of participating low income households through access to resources.  The goals of 
LIHTC developers and state housing financial authorities must combat different fears of unintended 
consequences: displacement and gentrification or neighborhood deterioration.  
The challenge of addressing both these fears is especially relevant in regards to Atlanta’s 
history with subsidized housing development.  HOPE VI redevelopment in Atlanta is often lauded as 
key to the reclaiming of downtown; history thus shows that quality privatized affordable housing can be 
utilized to attract economic development and investment in the area.  However, this was only in the 
context of massive renewal efforts and displacement of residents, not the smaller scale development 
current LIHTC program encourages separate from other larger programs like HOPE VI.  Furthermore, 
Sheriff finds that while gentrification occurred in 
HOPE VI neighborhoods, the change was not 
different from comparison tracts without HOPE 
VI development (2007).  Sites were chosen in 
part based on potential to harness positive 
effects of gentrification, but comparison tracts 
gentrified at about the same rates.  Thus HOPE 
VI itself did not definitively have an impact on 
the likelihood to gentrify, but instead was part of 
broader efforts and trends.  Additionally, the 
reshaping of neighborhoods through HOPE VI 
Figure 1. Median Household Income in Atlanta, 2010 
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did not result in a newly income-integrated Atlanta: the city is still home to vast spatial inequalities 
between classes (Florida 2012).  The difference is that segregation now happens at different spatial 
scales.  As Figure 1 shows, there remains a sharp segregation between devastatingly poor 
neighborhoods on the southwest sides of the metro area and richer, well-to-do neighborhoods on the 
northeast sides (Social Explorer, ACS 2010 5-year estimates).  Subsidized housing development alone 
is not likely to solve all problems of inequality in Atlanta, but the history of HOPE VI efforts suggests 
that displacing public housing tenants with this redevelopment just creates new, poorer neighborhoods 
in other parts of the city.  Massive crime, vacancy, and poverty in downtown areas shifted to other 
neighborhoods and were not cured. 
Currently, central city 
Atlanta-- especially near the 
Beltline-- is seeing a revival in 
development and land values, 
while certain suburban regions 
are holding their value and 
appeal for higher income 
residents.  Meanwhile, 
neighborhoods immediately 
south and west of downtown are 
still poverty-stricken, but with 
current development projects-- 
like the Beltline-- there is threat of these areas gentrifying along with the spread of other in-town 
development (Immergluck 2009).  Figure 2 shows median sales price of homes, ranging from as low as 
$31,000 (dark green) to as high as $685,000 (dark red) (Trulia.com).  Additionally, Atlanta is among the 
three worst metros for the “share of suburban poor living in tracts with poverty rates of at least 20%” 
with an increase of 29% in the past decade as well as having low rates of intergenerational mobility 
Figure 2. Median Sales Price of Homes in Atlanta, 2015 Figure 2. Median Sales Price of Homes in Atlanta, 2015 
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(Kneebone 2014).  When locating LIHTC developments in Atlanta, Georgia thus must keep in mind 
both historical attempts to develop mixed income neighborhoods as well as current neighborhood 
trends towards inequality and further segregation at different scales.  Suburban location does always 
not equate with high opportunity neighborhoods, and inner city location does not always equate to 
declining neighborhoods. 
How can the LIHTC program provide quality living situations for its tenants, while having a 
positive effect on the surrounding community?  Is it preferable to focus on locating housing in high 
poverty communities that need development, or is it better to attempt to deconcentrate poverty by 
locating affordable housing in higher income neighborhoods?  Or might a mix of these strategies, to 
create balanced, mixed location of projects, make the most sense?  Do LIHTC projects actually bring 
greater resources to QCT neighborhoods, in terms of economic development?  Do LIHTC projects in 
higher-income neighborhoods aid in deconcentrating poverty on a neighborhood scale that would not 
otherwise happen?  Do LIHTC projects aid in gentrification of neighborhoods, displacing poverty to 
other locations?  Are NIMBYism fears that LIHTC spurs disinvestment and deterioration, like past 
examples of public housing, founded in real effects? 
 
Evidence on the Effects of the LIHTC Program 
To answer these questions, there is considerably less literature on LIHTC developments than 
on HOPE VI or other large-scale housing programs, since the projects vary widely-- it is seen as a 
“funding mechanism not a development type” (Deng 2011, 784).  However, LIHTC is one of the most 
popular programs among private developers building affordable housing.  David Smith with the 
Affordable Housing Institute names it as “America’s most successful affordable rental housing 
production program ever,” defining this success by its longevity, with over two decades with permanent 
support and consistent funding, and its coverage with the financing of over 1,200,000 units (as of 2006) 
including over 95% of all new affordable multifamily housing nationwide (2006).  Furthermore, fixed 
10 
amount of credit availability each annual cycle creates a “virtuous-circle feedback cycle” increasing the 
ferocity of competition through developers striving to meet public goals as outlined in the QAP.  Thus 
the program’s size and prevalence, combined with the flexibility given to states to determine where and 
how they encourage development each year, makes it important to study the program’s impacts. 
Affordable housing policy can encourage developers to locate in neighborhoods they would not 
otherwise.   This is important in order to accomplish various public goals, such as: encouraging 
investment in QCTs, removing neighborhood disamenities through urban infill on vacant or derelict 
sites, discouraging segregation and isolation of lower income and minority populations, and allowing 
access to high opportunity neighborhoods for low income families.  Additionally, even with policy 
encouragement, developers may still shy away from developing in certain neighborhoods due to 
backlash and fear over possible neighborhood effects of subsidized housing.  Existing residents may 
put up barriers to a new subsidized influx of low income tenants, because they do not want affordable 
housing developments in their neighborhood (Not in My BackYard, or NIMBYism).    
Specifically, existing homeowners in higher opportunity neighborhoods “often fight fiercely” 
against any affordable housing development in their neighborhoods with the assumption that low 
income households, or even the existence of subsidized units themselves, will lead to the deterioration 
of the surrounding neighborhood (Deng 2011, 868).  Homeowners are less flexible to move to new 
neighborhoods if they perceive a change in conditions and they have money to lose in property values 
if affordable housing development affects the neighborhood in which that they own property.  This is 
specifically linked to perceived moral ills of low income families, as a less “deserving” recipient of 
government subsidization, since housing projects with senior populations face less backlash (Rohe & 
Freeman, 2001).   
What effect people expect LIHTC developments to have on surrounding areas depends on what 
type of neighborhoods they are located in.  What distinguishes LIHTC from other types of development, 
in regards to what effect it will have on different types of neighborhoods, is twofold, in that physical 
quality of construction can bring investment to lower income areas, while the lower incomes of the 
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residents may result in backlash from higher income areas (Freeman & Botein 2002). The influx of low-
income populations is feared to lead to disinvestment and lower property values.  Thus NIMBYism 
becomes a barrier to policy measures aimed at deconcentrating poverty.  
 In addition to neighborhood resistance, there are other challenges to locating in more affluent 
areas related to financial and legal feasibility.  For example, many sources of gap financing, like CDBG 
or HOME, are not available in affluent jurisdictions, because they are reserved to promote development 
in high poverty communities (Khadduri 2013, 8).  This, along with higher land acquisition costs, can 
make low income housing infeasible, since such properties cannot support as much debt (8).  
Additionally, exclusionary zoning limiting multi-family or rental developments in many affluent 
communities, with the intention of preserving neighborhood property values, prevents LIHTC 
development regardless of any policy incentives.  Proving to resistant neighborhoods that they have 
nothing to fear from the introduction of properly executed LIHTC development could thus aid in new 
financing sources as well as greater political feasibility in overcoming local resistance to siting such 
projects. 
As it stands, the flexibility and decentralized nature of the LIHTC program allows states to 
encourage funding for all types of projects in a variety of locations.  This includes underdeveloped rural 
areas as well as urban infill.  Deng assesses a variety of developments across the Miami area 
according to a cluster analysis and finds that they can be grouped in neighborhoods ranging from high 
poverty or working class to middle class suburbs (2011, 869).  Within the industry, representatives note 
that “developers and funders prefer to locate LIHTC developments in relatively safe and attractive 
places within a broader low-income community” (Edminston 2001, 16).  However, for the most part, 
LIHTC projects are developed in low-income neighborhoods.  McClure found that across all US 
metropolitan areas, 31.8% of LIHTC units placed in service in 2002 were located in tracts with fewer 
than 10% of the population in poverty (2008, 94).  However, this supply is a similar rate as the local 
demand for low income housing populations in these tracts, meeting neighborhood need for housing, 
but not doing anything to overcome regional need for housing with the access to amenities low poverty 
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neighborhoods proide.  Thus, while units are available for existing eligible populations in low poverty 
tracts, they do not promote income integration across a region.  Woo, et al, found similarly high levels 
of LIHTC projects concentrated in low-income neighborhoods in Charlotte and Cleveland between 1996 
and 2007, with 79% and 48% respectively (Woo, et al, 2014: 11).  Deirdre Oakley at GSU found that 
across four major metropolitan areas, including Atlanta, found that neighborhood characteristics 
associated with low income populations do not significantly predict the presence of LIHTC 
developments, although LIHTC developments do tend to cluster near other subsidized housing (2008, 
624).  More recently the program has achieved expansion into low poverty suburbs, particularly through 
scattered site development efforts, but for the most part they still remain geographically concentrated 
(McClure 2006).   
Developers often locate projects in low income areas, not only because there is less 
neighborhood resistance and lower acquisition costs, but because of both policy incentives and market 
positioning.  While QCTs gained more LIHTC units in Chicago, the research also shows that LIHTC 
developers “differentially select gentrifying neighborhoods” (Baum-Snow and Marion 2009, 665).  High 
poverty tracts with basis boosts attract more development, and this effect was more pronounced in 
tracts that had faster subsequent growth in housing values throughout the eighties in Chicago.  Land 
acquisition and development costs will be cheap in depressed areas, but if the neighborhood is on an 
upward trajectory, developers can reap the benefits of increasing real estate values.  They are able to 
buy the property cheaply, then after surrounding decreases in vacancies and crime, they can either 
start charging higher rents or at the end of the compliance period for affordability they can sell the 
property for much more.  Understanding what affects LIHTC location will aid in shaping how to 
incentivize location according to policy goals.  
Additionally, this conjecture suggests that LIHTC themselves likely have little effect on 
improving neighborhoods, instead taking advantage of existing trends.  Baum-Snow and Marion also 
evaluated how LIHTC developments impact neighborhoods, particularly in regards to type of 
neighborhood (Baum-Snow and Marion 2009).  They found that presence of LIHTC units depress 
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median incomes and has different effects in rental and owner-occupied housing markets (665).  In this 
study, LIHTC developments increased turnover in nearby owner-occupied housing, had a mixed effect 
on property values, and crowded out construction of other rental housing but not owner-occupied.  
These effects were different for declining neighborhoods than for gentrifying ones.  While presence of 
LIHTC projects raised property values in declining areas, there was no significant effect in gentrifying 
ones.  While on average for all neighborhoods for each 1 LIHTC unit built there was only an overall 
increase of 0.8 more rental units overall, for gentrifying neighborhoods each LIHTC unit only increased 
overall new units by 0.37.  Eriksen and Rosenthal in a study of LIHTC development across the country 
between 1990 and 2000 confirmed that, while LIHTC crowds out new development of rental housing, 
the impact of this on low/moderate rental housing is likely small (2010).  This indicates that in 
gentrifying neighborhoods, there is likely nothing to worry about in relation to NIMBYist fears.   
Confirming positive neighborhood effects, Ellen and Voicu found that new LIHTC developments 
increase sales prices for nearby properties in NYC (2007).   New developments increase immediate 
nearby sales prices by 5.7% and keep increasing prices over subsequent five years (2007, 4).  
However, this is in the particular context of New York City in the late 1980s and 90s, in which most 
developments in the study were built on distressed or vacant publicly-owned sites.  Before LIHTC 
development, immediate property values to sites in this study were 14.6% lower than farther away but 
in the same neighborhood, implying that the distressed sites were a disamenity themselves (1-5).   
In her study of LIHTC development in Santa Clara County between 1987 and 2000, Deng found 
similar results that LIHTC projects can have positive impacts on property values, but analyzes a wider 
range of neighborhood types.  She finds that all developments increased surrounding values (2011a, 
157).  This effect is quite modest for upper-income neighborhoods, but for low income property values 
increased by about 5% of sale price; this effect further increased to 10% when looking at LIHTC 
developments over 50 units (2011a, 157-8).  Green, et al, review eight pre-2002 studies in various 
cities that support the notion that LIHTC developments do not diminish property values, but instead 
may increase them in higher income areas; their own study finds mixed results-- several areas 
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appreciate in value more rapidly, but none deteriorated (2002). Additionally, the study did not find that 
tenant type mattered-- lower income LIHTC tenants and families did not impact property values more 
than elderly, as NIMBYists fear. 
In a study of Kansas City in 2000, Edmiston concluded that LIHTC had a positive impact on 
physical property conditions of neighborhoods, indicating that subsidizing housing for low income 
tenants did not lead to neighborhood deterioration and disinvestment (2011).  She linked this to 
possible “disamenity removal” through development of previously vacant or underutilized sites, because 
higher nearby property conditions were even more likely for large rehabs or small new developments 
(2011, 18).  Neighborhood effects of LIHTC development thus might be more positive than vacant or 
deteriorated existing sites, but not necessarily more than other types of new development.  This has an 
important conclusion when considering neighborhood type: high income places are likely to be able to 
attract other types of development, while high poverty neighborhoods may be stuck with vacant site 
disamenities without subsidized development.  Nevertheless, the study still showed no evidence that 
any decrease in property conditions occur nearby LIHTC, so higher income neighborhood resistance is 
unwarranted. 
Other literature suggests that LIHTC developments are too small to have any discernible effect 
on neighborhood quality, with no literature showing they cause neighborhoods to gentrify  “as 
measured by quality measures such as well-performing schools, responsive public services, or safety” 
(Khadduri 2013, 2).  While the investment in a new development may attract “special attention” to the 
area, even when engaging in disamenity removal by developing on a high profile vacant site, there are 
“few examples in which the revitalization of a development has placed the neighborhood on a positive 
trajectory” (Khadduri 2013, 3).  Without further “concentration of resources, interventions in areas other 
than housing, or diversity of housing types”, one development cannot singlehandedly do it all (2013, 2).  
Thus, Khadduri argues that rather than locate LIHTC with the intention of attracting further development 
in disinvested areas, instead state governments should focus on locating LIHTC in “balanced” locations 
to provide fair housing opportunities to low income families.  Building in poorer locations only furthers 
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concentration of poverty and minorities, even if a neighborhood would not see new development 
otherwise: locating in low poverty census tracts gives families better access to jobs, resources, and 
educational opportunities, strengthening the legal commitment to fair housing (3).   
Additionally, poor neighborhoods with existing older LIHTC will already see new LIHTC 
development when these properties reach the end of the compliance period and are eligible for 
recapitalization (3).  There are competitive scoring points in the QAP favoring rehabilitation and 
preservation of existing affordable units, so that current tenants are not displaced and can continue 
living in the development (DCA 2009-2015).  Any subsequent new placement of LIHTC units in low 
income areas disproportionately favors these areas, continuing concentration of poverty.  Instead, 
developers and state housing authorities should consider the overall distribution of LIHTC units-- both 
existing and new.  Thus, a prioritization of locating new construction in low poverty tracts will thus 
maintain balance in choice and opportunity for families in a variety of neighborhoods. 
Meanwhile, Deng argues that the mixed results regarding the impact of LIHTC is due to the vast 
diversity of the projects, including the neighborhood context.  LIHTC will have different effects on 
property values, for example, depending on whether property values are high or low to begin with 
(2011).  She finds that black high-poverty and black/Hispanic working class neighborhoods had the 
most positive changes after LIHTC, while mostly middle-class neighborhoods and several working class 
neighborhoods had the most negative change (2011, 891).  She attributes this to how dramatic 
changes occur when LIHTC developments “represent a significant portion of their neighborhood 
housing stock”, either for better or worse (2011, 891).  Also, for-profit developers are more willing to 
select distressed neighborhoods only if “they see something special about them, such as the presence 
of public subsidies or potential signs of revitalization” like market upturn or designation for 
redevelopment plans (891).  In other words, neighborhoods are already on “the verge of transition” 
regardless of LIHTC impact. 
 Atlanta’s history physically deteriorated public housing in crime-ridden, economically segregated 
neighborhoods drives the importance of current housing programs to consider neighborhood effects of 
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developments.  Concentration of poverty in historical public housing seemed to only aggravate 
problems, so one way to avoid repeating mistakes is to better integrate subsidized housing into 
neighborhoods across the class lines.  However, more affluent neighborhoods resist LIHTC placement 
in even small scale developments for fear of crime and impact on property values.  The literature varies 
as to what effect LIHTC has on nearby neighborhoods, but despite differences in effect on low versus 
high poverty communities, and possible causes for this, there is little evidence upholding NIMBYist 
resistance.  Discovering what effect LIHTC developments have on Atlanta neighborhoods in particular 
will further contextualize this evidence and help shape policy directions for the city in particular. 
 
Data and Methods 
In order to examine the association of LIHTC units with change in neighborhood characteristics, 
I matched the number of LIHTC units placed in service between 2000 and 2005 to census tracts in the 
5-county Atlanta metro area.  These five counties include Clayton, Cobb, DeKalb, Fulton, and Gwinnett; 
this includes the urban center as well as outlying suburban areas and smaller nearby cities such as 
Decatur, Norcross, Marietta, and Sandy Springs.  There are a total of 478 total tracts in the study area.   
I selected the range of time for units placed in service based on available Census data.  The 
data for 2000 will show pre-existing conditions for the tracts, since it will likely take some time for any 
units placed in service during this initial year to have any effect on surrounding neighborhoods.  To 
control for LIHTC units that existed before the study timeline, including units renovated as “new” units in 
the 2000-2005 data, I added a variable with this information for the study area.  The year 2005 was 
chosen to correspond to the American Community Survey 4-year estimate data for 2005-2009.  This 
gives enough time for any changes that could correlate with new developments to manifest, while 
avoiding noise in the data from the foreclosure crisis shortly after the time period.  Additionally, the 
2005-2009 estimate was chosen since it is the last year that the Census used 2000 census tract 
boundaries, so that data from both sets would match.  Choosing the most recent public datasets 
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available over a range of years proceeding the foreclosure crisis during a more normal housing market 
will help shed the light on the future direction of LIHTC development. 
LIHTC unit data were retrieved from the official HUD database (www.lihtc.huduser.org) and any 
missing information was checked against an in-house list from the Georgia Department of Community 
Affairs.  This dataset includes number of subsidized units for each project, 2000 Census tract, as well 
as addresses and coordinates useful for geocoding. 
 
Variables 
What variables should be used to determine socioeconomic impact of neighborhoods?  Ryan 
Sheriff used five indicators to assess gentrification in HOPE VI neighborhoods, based on Lance 
Freeman’s study on socioeconomic change in urban neighborhoods: median income, median housing 
age, educational attainment, median housing price, percent of high income buyers (2007, 7; 2006).  
Sheriff’s discussed how influx of more affluent populations into neighborhoods, along with subsequent 
reinvestment, defines gentrification (2007, 8).  Tracking the above variables measures this, because 
variables like educational attainment are not likely to change in regards to specific nearby residents, but 
would be an indicator of shifting demographics and new populations.  Median housing age is proximate 
to measuring new development, and median housing price indicates assessed economic value of the 
property.  Using these variables will help assess the extent of socioeconomic change that occurs 
alongside tracts with and without new LIHTC units. 
Deng used eight indicators to measure change, noting that these are commonly used indicators 
of “key components of neighborhood quality of life” and are able to “capture different aspects of 
neighborhood economic well-being” (2011, 878).  They measure the two ways LIHTC can impact 
neighborhoods. First, surrounding populations of neighborhoods can change in response to the influx of 
disadvantaged, low income tenants, and this change she measures through three variables 
(unemployment rate, poverty rate, and percentage of households receiving public assistance).  The 
remaining variables assess economic change in the neighborhood in correlation with the LIHTC as 
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quality, new development (median household income, median gross rent, median housing value, 
number of units built in last 10 years, conventional single-family mortgage approval rates) (2011, 878). 
However, all variables to some extent measure both the direct impact of tenants and secondary 
impacts of subsequent perceived attractiveness of the neighborhood. 
Based on these studies, I considered six variables from Census data that indicate economic 
characteristics of both people and place within census tracts, to triangulate on whether neighborhoods 
declined or gentrified over the time period.  I also controlled for urban versus suburban/rural tracts 
through population density, to assess whether the push/pull between these categories affected change 
in the other variables over the time period. 
The nine variables are listed below.  In parentheses are the variable names used in subsequent 
statistics tables, with either “00” at the end for data from Census 2000 or “05” for data from the ACS 
2005-2009 estimate. 
● Percent of population with at least some college education (college) 
● Percent employed (emp) 
● Median income (medinc) 
● Occupancy rate for housing units (occ) 
● Median year housing units built (yrbuilt) 
● Median housing values (hval) 
● Median rent (rent) 
● Population density, in population per square mile (popdens) 
● LIHTC units placed in service 2000-2005 (lihtc) 
● LIHTC units squared (lihtc2) 




Figure 3 shows that with the total mean population of census tracts changing by 1,118 people 
(totpop_chg), the mean population density also changed by about 327 people per square mile 
(popdens_chg).  The change in population density varies from tracts losing 8,464 people per square 
mile to tracts gaining almost 16,000, with a standard deviation of about 1,500. 
With increased urbanization, Atlantan census tracts on average became more attractive places, 
with rent and housing values increasing.  The population became more educated, unemployment 
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Figure 3. Descriptive Statistics for All Variables 
20 
decreased (slightly), and income increased.  However not all indicators show positive change.  On 
average, vacancies increased and housing stock grew older.  The variance of average median income 
of tracts belied continued inequality across the Atlanta region, with a standard deviation of almost 
$25,000 in 2000 and $31,000 in 2005-9.  With the poorest tract clocking in at a median income of only 
$4,705 in 2000 and $9,066 in 2005-9, and the richest tract at $163,474 and $236,944, this is an 
incredible display of disparity in the region.  Similarly, with a standard deviation larger than the mean 
change in housing values, not all tracts benefited from rising values over this time period. 
There are a total of 21,020 units of LIHTC housing in the study area, divided among 119 
developments in 76 census tracts.  Many of the developments in the same tracts are different phases of 
the same project, so were applied for and placed in service in different years.  The average census 
tract has 44 LIHTC units, with a maximum of 1,305 units in census tract 220.08 containing downtown 
Clarkston in DeKalb County.   
Figure 4 shows that, on average, for both 2000 and the 2005-9 estimate, tracts without LIHTC 
developments scored higher on all socioeconomic indicators than tracts with LIHTC.  However, for 
several variables, LIHTC tracts saw higher average change.  LIHTC tracts saw average change of 
3.13% population obtaining higher education, compared to non-LIHTC with 0.86% change.  The 
average median age of housing for LIHTC became younger by 7 years over the time period, while for 
non-LIHTC only by 3 years.  Rent in LIHTC tracts also increased by an average of $204, which is 
slightly higher than the $200 average increase in non-LIHTC tracts.  The index discussed below 
summarizes these overall change in neighborhood conditions on a geographic level, further 





  Statistics Averages 





Index00 -20 14 5.1 0.04 -3.08 0.65 
Index05 -11 9 3.7 0.01 -1.95 0.4 




Neighborhood Conditions Index 
Several studies label neighborhoods according to categories related to changes in conditions 
over time.  Baum-Snow and Marion in their study characterized neighborhoods as declining, stable, and 
gentrifying, depending on which tercile they fall in appreciation of housing values over ten years (2008, 
655).  As touched on previously, Deng grouped Miami census tracts in clusters, in regards to 
geographic proximity and race/class demographic characteristics.  To assess relative change between 
them and how presence of LIHTC correlates with changes, she took an average Z score of all variables 
over the study period (2011, 879).  She then grouped neighborhoods according to most positive or 
most negative changes for future study.   
Following concepts from these studies, an index based on all variables used in this study will 
help show overall differences between tracts with and without new LIHTC units.  To build this index, I 
Figure 4. Average Values of Variables According to LIHTC Presence 
Figure 5. Descriptive Statistics of Neighborhood Conditions Index 
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added all the standardized values of the seven socioeconomic variables.  Tracts with missing data were 
omitted.  I created indices to assess neighborhoods both before and after new LIHTC units were placed 
in service.  The change over the time period for the index was calculated by subtracting index values 
for 2005-9 from those from 2000.  Figures 6-7 show the changes ranging from most negative (red) to 
most positive (green). 
On average, tracts with LIHTC development do worse on the indices than those without LIHTC 
both before and after units are placed in service.  Overall average index ratings are near 0, whereas 
they are negative for LIHTC tracts and positive for non-LIHTC tracts.  However, the change in index 
shows that on average tracts with LIHTC increase in socioeconomic health after LIHTC development, 
while tracts without LIHTC decrease in quality.  This striking change is shown on Figure 7.  The spatial 
distribution of LIHTC units also shows a concentration of units in low income tracts, when compared to 
the map of income segregation in Figure 1.  Even those developments in northern and eastern tracts, 
Figure 6. Maps of Neighborhood Conditions Index For Both Years 
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the overall wealthier 
region of the city, are 
located in pockets of 
lower median income 
relative to the 
surrounding tracts.  
Thus, while LIHTC are 
not placed in the best 
neighborhoods to begin 
with, these 
neighborhoods are more 
likely to have overall 
positive change than 
those without LIHTC, 
although overall quality 
still stays below the average of non-LIHTC tracts.  Isolating which variables are likely to drive this 
average effect will further detail how exactly new LIHTC correlates with neighborhood change. 
 
 
Measuring the Association Between LIHTC Units and Neighborhood Change 
For the next step, I did a series of multivariate regressions to see if any of the socioeconomic 
variables from the 2005-091 dataset could be predicted by the number of LIHTC units in the census 
tract.  I experimented with controlling for each 2000 variable, as well as population density and LIHTC 
before the study period, to see what best explained variability for each dependent variable in 2005-9, 
                                               
1 The ACS 2005-2009 dataset is an estimate over this time period, so that these data are essentially estimating 
information for 2007, the midpoint of the time period. 
Figure 7. Map of Change in Neighborhood Conditions Index 
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controlling for the initial value of the dependent variable in 2000.  Thus the analysis measures the 
association between LIHTC units and the change in the dependent variables from 2000 to 2005-9.  The 
overall results show that number of LIHTC units explains some of the variability in median housing 
value, median rent, and year built, but has little correlation with occupancy, education attainment, or 
median income.    
 
Median Housing Value   
As Figure 8 shows, there was a wide range of variability in change of housing value between 
2000 and 2005-9.  I will next see what variables explain this variation, including if number of LIHTC 
units placed in service affects housing value. 
Controlling for socioeconomic variables, existing LIHTC units, and population density, this 
model has a high adjusted R-square value of .916, meaning that this set of independent variables 
predicts 92% of the variability of median housing values in 2005-9 (Figure 8).  The analysis of variability 
similarly allows the rejection of the null hypothesis that hval05 does not have a linear relationship with 
the independent variables.  This model also tests for collinearity to see if this is affecting the 
significance of LIHTC units.  While many of the control variables are multicollinear, as to be expected, 
relatively low multicollinearity for LIHTC units shows that they have additional explanatory power in 
relation to the control variables. 
Overall, as shown in Figure 9, the existence of LIHTC can explain the change in median 
housing values over this time period in a way the control variables themselves do not.  Number of new 
LIHTC units is significant at a confidence level of less than 90%.  However, the coefficient is positive.  
In the model, for every 1 unit of LIHTC housing, median housing values in census tracts in 2005-9 
increased by about $32.  While not a sizable effect, this does show at least that development of this 
type of affordable housing does not result in drastically lower property values in the nearby housing 




Model R R Square 
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Square 
Std. Error of 
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t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 2210846.483 326258.632   6.776 .000 
popdens00 -2.663 1.026 -.043 -2.596 .010 
college00 -61.903 158.729 -.010 -.390 .697 
emp00 -1480.712 266.780 -.097 -5.550 .000 
medinc00 .794 .159 .154 5.000 .000 
occ00 -1985.844 435.320 -.076 -4.562 .000 
yrbuilt00 -947.619 168.718 -.099 -5.617 .000 
hvalue00 1.337 .036 .917 36.698 .000 
rent00 -27.768 10.937 -.054 -2.539 .011 
lihtc 31.562 26.174 .031 1.206 .228 
lihtc2 -.020 .035 -.015 -.571 .568 
lihtc_before 10.792 17.482 .009 .617 .537 
 
Median rent 
Most tracts had somewhat modest increases in rent of several hundred dollars.  Through 
multiple regressions I will test whether this variability can be explained by how many LIHTC units were 
placed in service over the time period.  Figure 10 shows that the model for predicting median rent in 
2005-9 has a sizable R square value of .683.  The confidence level of the effect of LIHTC units on rents 
is only significant at a p value above 10%.  However, it has a modestly negative effect on rent in 2005-
9: for every 10 units of LIHTC, rents in the surrounding area decrease by almost $2.  This shows that, 
while confidence in the surrounding real estate market (as measured by hval05) is not affected by the 
development of subsidized units, the affordability of nearby rental units remains.  Housing values do not 
plummet and the rent burden of local residents does not increase, but may actually make nearby rental 
housing more affordable.  
Figure 8. Model Summary for Median Housing Value 
Figure 9. Regression Results for Median Housing Value 
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Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 









t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 5830.881 1297.958   4.492 .000 
popdens00 -.004 .004 -.034 -1.030 .304 
college00 -1.315 .610 -.103 -2.155 .032 
emp00 -4.050 1.104 -.126 -3.669 .000 
medinc00 .007 .001 .628 10.812 .000 
occ00 -1.095 1.802 -.020 -.608 .544 
yrbuilt00 -2.537 .674 -.125 -3.763 .000 
hvalue00 .000 .000 -.153 -3.698 .000 
rent00 .580 .046 .528 12.689 .000 
lihtc -.176 .109 -.084 -1.626 .105 
lihtc2 8.778E-05 .000 .031 .613 .540 
lihtc_before .003 .072 .001 .041 .967 
 
Median Income 
Using median income of households in the census tract similarly will test the possible 
gentrification effects of LIHTC development.  As Figure 12 shows, these results show that the 
correlation of LIHTC units with median household income in 2005-9 is statistically significant at a 
greater than a 90% confidence level, with a modest negative effect.  For each new subsidized unit, 
median income decreases by almost $11.  This does show that LIHTC development does not attract 
higher income populations into the area.  However, the negative effect may be because of the influx of 
lower income population into LIHTC units themselves, not necessarily increase in lower populations in 
the rest of the neighborhood.  Nonetheless, there is no conclusion that LIHTC dramatically affects the 





Figure 10. Model Summary for Median Rent 
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Adjusted R 
Square 
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t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 662653.567 75845.302   8.737 .000 
popdens00 -.647 .249 -.044 -2.603 .010 
college00 139.410 35.635 .097 3.912 .000 
emp00 -255.637 64.564 -.070 -3.959 .000 
medinc00 1.175 .037 .955 31.879 .000 
occ00 -314.338 105.393 -.051 -2.983 .003 
yrbuilt00 -311.578 39.396 -.136 -7.909 .000 
hvalue00 .026 .007 .083 3.883 .000 
rent00 -8.184 2.628 -.067 -3.114 .002 
lihtc -11.889 6.348 -.050 -1.873 .062 
lihtc2 .008 .008 .025 .982 .327 
lihtc_before 7.042 4.237 .024 1.662 .097 
a. Dependent Variable: medinc05 
 
Other Results 
 Results were inconclusive for the other variables (Median Year Built, Educational Attainment, 







Figure 12. Model Summary for Median Income 




Dependent Variable Effect of LIHTC (*significance) 
Housing Value Small positive effect 
Rent Small negative effect  
Year Built Small positive effect *** 
Housing Units Small positive effect ** 
Occupancy Possible positive effect 
College Attainment Possible negative effect 
Income Small negative effect* 
Employment Possible negative effect 
 
Summarizing Results 
While the index shows that tracts with LIHTC more often have overall positive changes than 
those without LIHTC, the regressions in Figure 14 show that the effects of LIHTC on each variable are 
minimal and not consistently positive.  This should assuage worries both 1) that the influx of low income 
tenants that new LIHTC bring to middle/high income neighborhoods will lead to deterioration of those 
neighborhoods and 2) that new investment through LIHTC development will lead to gentrification in low 
income neighborhoods.  In this case, minimal effect means existing residents in neighborhoods need 
not worry about the introduction of affordable housing changing their lives in a discernible way.  
Housing policy should thus encourage development in locations that either have a lack of quality 
affordable housing or have good opportunity and access to resources for tenants.  
 Future research can study this with a longer time difference between datasets, to see if the 
likelihood that LIHTC correlates with neighborhood change takes more time to take effect.  Also, 
studying the effects on low income and higher income neighborhood separately may also help identify if 
LIHTC has different effects depending on what the neighborhood is like to begin with. 
Figure 14. Regression Results Summary 
29 
 However, despite lack of evidence showing negative change in neighborhood conditions, 
irrational fears of existing residents may persist.  Other existing barriers, like high acquisition costs and 
exclusionary zoning, may also persist.  Housing policy thus still has an important role in determining 
where LIHTC developments are placed and why. 
 
Policy Implications 
Qualified Allocation Plans “shape what applicants propose and what moves forward” in the 
process for selecting successful LIHTC developments (Shelburne 2008: 1).  Analyzing what 
requirements affect location selection and subsequent community development effects will help direct 
how state departments can harness positive neighborhood effects of LIHTC in the research into policy.  
Khadduri argues that QAPs should aim to balance LIHTC locations between disinvested neighborhoods 
and low poverty ones, so as to further fair housing through opportunity and choice for low income 
households.  She outlines four main priorities QAPs should have to accomplish this (2013, 10): 
● Limit priorities for LIHTC developments in low-income neighborhoods to those that have 
neighborhood revitalization efforts with a real chance of success.   
● Limit incentives that lock in the historical geography of affordable housing   
● Create incentives for locating projects in high-opportunity neighborhoods   
● Change QAP provisions that block projects from being developed in high-opportunity 
neighborhoods   
Only those developments with the biggest guarantee of not furthering historical poverty concentration 
and chance of revitalizing neighborhoods should be encouraged.  LIHTC by their nature do not 
necessarily turn a neighborhood around just through new construction and quality units;  there must be 
an intentional effort to use the development as only one tool within a greater revitalization plan for 
change.  Meanwhile, QAPs should attempt to dismantle existing challenges for developers to locate 
projects in “high-opportunity neighborhoods”; feasibility characteristics and historical barriers prevent 
30 
these areas from attracting LIHTC.  The evidence from this study should help calm resistance by 
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LIHTC development appears to have a dissimilar effect on the housing and rental markets in the 
area, but how does this affect the likelihood that census tracts will attract new development due to 
LIHTC?  The mean age of housing stock in 2000 was 26 years, and this increases slightly to about 30 
years old in 2005-9 (Figure 15).  This indicates that overall housing stock in Atlanta is aging and on 
average there was not much as much new development as in past years.  However, some census 
tracts did see a large influx of new development, with average year built increasing by as much as 50 
years. 
Through multiple regression, I will test to what extent LIHTC explains this variability.  Overall, 
the number of LIHTC units in a census tract does not seem to explain higher levels of development in 
the area past the new LIHTC development itself (Figure 16).  The variable is highly significant, at a 
confidence level of 99%, which is to be expected as hundreds of new units in a tract has a direct effect 
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on median age of housing.  However, the effect is modest, in that for every 100 units built, median age 
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t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 10.240 50.549   .203 .840 
popdens00 -.001 .000 -.160 -6.783 .000 
college00 .120 .024 .177 5.060 .000 
emp00 -.454 .043 -.264 -10.544 .000 
medinc00 -2.862E-05 .000 -.049 -1.163 .246 
occ00 -.459 .070 -.156 -6.528 .000 
yrbuilt00 1.039 .026 .959 39.585 .000 
hvalue00 1.132E-05 .000 .075 2.508 .012 
rent00 -.004 .002 -.076 -2.520 .012 
lihtc .013 .004 .115 3.074 .002 
lihtc2 -8.497E-06 .000 -.056 -1.521 .129 
lihtc_before -.002 .003 -.012 -.625 .532 
a. Dependent Variable: yrbuilt05 
To better assess to what extent new LIHTC development affected the change in median age, I 
also conducted the analysis with the dependent variable of total housing units.  There was a total 
increase of 248,679 housing units, with an average increase of 520 units.  Census tracts gained on 
average only 44 LIHTC units each, with at least some of these units replacing old units.  While vastly 
more housing units were added to the metro region than solely LIHTC units, whether these units were 
added to tracts with LIHTC could be telling.  Tracts with any number of new LIHTC gained on average 
786 total units and 269 affordable units.   
The regression results show that, with above a 90% confidence level, for every 10 new LIHTC 
units, there are 10.43 additional units overall in 2005-9 per census tract (Figure 18).  Meanwhile, for 
Figure 15. Model Summary 
Figure 16. Regression Results Summary 
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every 10 existing LIHTC units in a tract, housing units in 2005-9 decreased by almost 2 units.  Thus, 
even accounting for renovation of existing units, LIHTC development appears to not add significantly to 
overall housing stock.  There is, however, the possibility that without LIHTC development, these tracts 
may have lost units overall. 
Figure 17. Descriptive Statistics for Total Housing Units 
 
 
Figure 18. Predicting Total Housing Units in 2005-9 
Model Summary 
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t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) -2746.809 8010.116   -.343 .732 
popdens00 -.110 .023 -.124 -4.827 .000 
college00 3.091 3.350 .036 .923 .357 
emp00 -7.074 6.086 -.032 -1.162 .246 
medinc00 .002 .003 .026 .559 .576 
occ00 -13.245 9.654 -.036 -1.372 .171 
yrbuilt00 2.590 4.139 .019 .626 .532 
hvalue00 .000 .001 .017 .522 .602 
rent00 -.737 .241 -.100 -3.056 .002 
lihtc 1.043 .584 .073 1.786 .075 
lihtc2 -.001 .001 -.040 -.998 .319 
lihtc_before -.259 .390 -.014 -.664 .507 
hous00 1.254 .039 .880 32.283 .000 
a. Dependent Variable: hous05 
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Occupancy 
While LIHTC units seem to decrease rents in the surrounding area, do they also decrease 
occupancy rates of nearby units?  In other words, are rents decreasing because people are leaving the 
area to rent elsewhere?  Or, since housing values rise in tracts with LIHTC, does this attract people to 
buy unoccupied houses?  Overall, these variables have a much lower predictability for the variance in 
occupancy in 2005-9 than they do for previously discussed variables.  With this in mind, LIHTC units 
are not a statistically significant predictor for occupancy rates, with low confidence rates of below 60% 
(Figure 19).  If anything, they barely affect occupancy, with every affordable unit increasing occupancy 
by less than half a percentage points.  This suggests that perhaps LIHTC units correlate with nearby 
housing attracting additional residents, and thus not leaving the tract to live elsewhere, but the null 
hypothesis cannot be rejected. 
Figure 19. Predicting Occupancy Levels in 2005-9 
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t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) -46.865 51.978   -.902 .368 
popdens00 -.001 .000 -.149 -3.921 .000 
college00 .115 .024 .266 4.736 .000 
emp00 .023 .044 .021 .527 .598 
medinc00 5.397E-05 .000 .146 2.144 .033 
occ00 .483 .072 .258 6.722 .000 
yrbuilt00 .038 .027 .055 1.410 .159 
hvalue00 6.200E-06 .000 .065 1.335 .183 
rent00 .002 .002 .059 1.224 .222 
lihtc .002 .004 .033 .549 .583 
lihtc2 -2.423E-06 .000 -.025 -.422 .673 
lihtc_before -.004 .003 -.047 -1.478 .140 
a. Dependent Variable: occ05 
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Educational Attainment 
To further test what effect new LIHTC units have on nearby populations, I will test to see if the 
percentage of the population that has at least some college education changes along with LIHTC units.  
Since it is unlikely new LIHTC units would inspire nearby residents to attend higher education, any 
gains in educational attainment would be attributed to a new influx of educated residents and perhaps 
indicate gentrification in the area.  However, the results of this show that the number of new subsidized 
units does not correlate in a statistically significant manner with fluctuations in the educational 
attainment of nearby residents (Figure 20).  If anything, it is possible that LIHTC units result in attracting 
a less educated population, but only by less than 1 percentage point more population with college 
education for every 100 units. Thus, these results are inconclusive overall, except that it is unlikely 
LIHTC development attracts either more or less educated populations to any noticeable effect in 
surrounding areas. 
Figure 20. Predicting Educational Attainment in 2005-9 
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t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 386.980 66.777   5.795 .000 
popdens00 -.001 .000 -.071 -3.123 .002 
college00 .828 .031 .891 26.435 .000 
emp00 -.370 .057 -.157 -6.502 .000 
medinc00 .000 .000 .190 4.652 .000 
occ00 -.709 .092 -.177 -7.681 .000 
yrbuilt00 -.142 .035 -.096 -4.083 .000 
hvalue00 6.791E-06 .000 .033 1.138 .256 
rent00 -.002 .002 -.023 -.780 .436 
lihtc -.007 .006 -.046 -1.272 .204 
lihtc2 6.074E-06 .000 .029 .823 .411 
lihtc_before .001 .004 .003 .172 .864 
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a. Dependent Variable: college05 
Employment 
However, it is also possible that development of new housing in the area generated economic 
interest in the area, creating new jobs for local populations.  The model for percent of the population 
employed in 2005-9, however, only explains about 32% of the variation (Figure 21).  Additionally, the 
number of LIHTC units are not statistically significant at a greater than 90% confidence level.  If 
anything, for every 100 LIHTC units there is a decrease of only less than one percentage point in 
employed populations. 
Figure 20. Predicting Educational Attainment in 2005-9 
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